323rd Bombardment Group, June 10, 1944 Clecy and Cerisy Forest Footage

Pat,

it's 18.5 nautical miles from Mezidon to the center of Caen. If my calculations are correct, if the aircraft were traveling at 200 m/hour, it would taken them 5.5 minutes to get from Mezidon to the very center of Caen.

If we assume they turned right at Mezidon, it would have taken them at least a minute to line up with the RR tracks. Then, they had to tighten up the formations - bombing was by fours.let's say two minutes. The bomb run had to have commenced by the time they reached the sideling. Because it was a very hot target, the bomb run could not have been more than 30 seconds.

We have to get them to a road/highway junction that is roughly one mile past a bridge (can't recall if Hwy or RR). That road junction would have to be Southwest of streets and houses, which sounds residential or urban.

The 9th AF report says Stach went down near Mezidon, just before the target.

What's hanging me up is the French accounts indicating that 1/4 of the city center was destroyed. I'm having a hard time outing them that far up the rail line from Mezidon.

Will keep working it.

Jan

 

Pat,

Check your mail. Just sent you the strike photo of Caen June 6. It was misfiled at National Archives with Clecy June 7. They had Clecy as Caen and Caen as June 7. This puts us at the city center, sadly. No doubt Montgomery demanded the strikes, which set off major fires and inflicted civilian casualties needlessly.

Jan
[hr]
I am having trouble with your link. Will try on my Mac.

 

Pat and Sean,

Thank you. This is indeed the June 6 Caen RJ mission flown by the 323rd. It's the strike photo that was mislabeled at Naitonal Archives as Caen June 7.

"And Lot's wife, of course, was told not to look back where all those people and their homes had been. But she did look back, and I love her for that, because it was so human. So she was turned into a pillar of salt. So it goes."

-Slaughterhouse Five, Kurt Vonnegut

Paradoxically, my dad, the lead bombardier for the 456th for about half of his almost 70 combat missions, was also a pillar of salt. That must have been hard.

Thank you for giving so much time and bringing your excellent research skills to bear in solving the mystery of the Clecy/Cerisy Footage/"Caen RJ" mystery. Seeing these photos and the video, I understand the war as it was experienced by the airmen much better. Your assistance has filled a big gap in the understanding necessary to write a more human account of the 456th and the role they played in a much bigger plan.

Warm regards,

Jan

 

Pat,

Thank you for your valid and considered perspective. The choices available and decisions made in war can't often be fairly judged in retrospect.

There is a documentary by Marcel Ophuls, A Memory of Justice, that explores those issues by looking at the Nuremburg Trials and Mi Lai massacre of the war in Southeast Asia. The title refers to Plato's perfect Platinic forms or ideals and his allegory of the cave. In the documentary, you see people who had done horrible things during the Jewush genocide doing everyday acts of kindness, like helping a disabled man put on ear phones. Anyone who thinks he or she would handle themselves perfectly in war has not fought one, which is not to excuse the atrocities.

Richard Turber and John Camp with the Boxted Airfield Museum in Essex County near Earls Colne, have about one-third of the fuselage of Black Magic IV/Me. Shorty, which was flown by the 323rd. I'll be delivery my dad's uniform to them in the next few months.

Richard and John found some great footage of the 323rd preparing for and flying a combat mission from Earls Colne. It had to have been shot between July and late November 1943 because Col. Herbert Thatcher is the CO of the 323rdvin the video. I don't think there is enough in the video to identify the target, but it is insightful. I believe the Hustiry Channel's Vattle Stations episode in the B-26 was based in part on that footage.

I will find and post the link.

If you know if a good book or article covering the bombing of Caen and the choices available to Eisenhower, et al., I'd appreciate the referral.

Jan

 

Thank you, Pat. I've ordered both books and look forward to reading them.

The work that you do would make a very good television series. Solving these puzzles is fascinating- each a page turner. Moreover, they are stories of dedication to duty, cooperation and serving a purpose bigger than any inidividual.

 

Hi, Pat,

A very Happy Easter to you. I trust the Easter Bunny found his way to the Curran household.

I am still working through your logic regarding the aiming point. Will respond as soon as I am done.

I had not seen the footage you just linked in your most recent posting. As I was watching it, I took screen shots to see if there were any identifiable markings on any of the aircraft. I was shocked when I looked back at them. There is a very clear shot of what appears to be WT-B "The Gremlin II" crossing into France near what may be Carbourg. If that is correct, my dad, Walt, is visible sitting in the nose, and JD Helton, the pilot, is visible in the left cockpit seat. It's beyond surreal.

They, in fact, flew to Caen RJ on D-Day in "The Gremlin II", which was Helton's usual aircraft, per E Squadron's loading list. Of the approximate 17 missions they flew together, all but a couple were in WT-B. Confirmation of the date of the footage should be enough to verify; however, I will try to get the last three digits of the serial number on the tail.

I don't have a photo (other than possibly this footage) of my dad an JD together, but do have individual photographs of both. There is a very nice story about JD clhallenging Generals Marshall, Arnold an Anderson when the met with the senior, high mission 323rd crews on or about June 13 at Earls Colne. Helton persuaded them to limit the B-26 combat crew tour of duty to 65 missions over enemy lines. The Generals were impressed bu his courae and had a picture taken of Helton standing with them. JD (and a few others) got to go home about 10 days later, and my dad was assigned to the 456th's CO's crew. JD had everyone's respect and appreciation for that.

To perhaps add to the story, the widely published briefing photo that I sent to you likely was taken during the briefing for Caen RJ. Helton is second from the right in the first row, my dad is in the second row on the middle aisle with a ball cap. With a little further study, I should be able to tentatively ID Maj. Stach and other crew members. (Helton is sitting next to two Captains if I remember correctly.) one might be Hunt, with whom "Tex" of the rail tracks was flying as gunner.

Jan

 

Hi, Pat,

Looking closely at the CP-provided stills, the aircraft's serial number ends in 708, meaning it can only be The Gremlin II. Progressing further along the stills, the lighting stays very consistent, indicating the same cloud cover and time of day-late afternoon (the aircraft are backlit from the west) crossing the coast at Carbourg as you have plotted. Together with the crispness of the invasion stripes and E Squadron's loading list for D-Day Caen RJ and the briefing photo, I think we have Helton and Foster captured on film. I doubt there was any press coverage of the three morning missions due to secrecy, and the backlighting is wrong.

Because I had records on about 70 missions to review and print from a rented PC, I only printed off the loading lists that documented my dad's service. There were probably two other loading lists for that mission. So, I don't have access at home to determine which RJ aircraft and crew is in the other clear stills. I will try to get over to a PC at Fed Ex to print more off.

I will send you scans of my records for Clecy and Caen RJ with the hope that Photoshop can make them more legible. If we could see the pilot notes on Caen RJ, it would really help pinpoint their aiming point.

They appear to have flown up the tracks from the hard right turn at Mezidon into Caen where it turned into Rue de Garre, which runs parallel to Rue de Falaise. Helton's notes look like they would be very helpful, but I have had limited success in figuring out what they say.

Complicating it some, the aircraft flew in Flights of four, as opposed to the typical six. (Hence three boxes of 12 as opposed to two Boxes of 18.) This method came into play in May to improve their success in hitting the bridges between Paris and the Atlantic Wall. Individual aircraft were given greater latitude to lock on the target (or target of opportunity) and bomb somewhat independently. However, "true"bombardier's were in short supply, so only aircraft with an officer bombardier (who had been through both navigation, advanced navigation and bombardier school-all at distinct airfields in the States) would do so. Another look at the loading list will reveal more in that regard.

More to follow.

Jan
[hr]
Pfc. Pat(ricia), Lt. Walt Foster and Pfc. Oscar
Laon/Athies Airfield, France
December 16, 1944

 

Pat,

The 9th AF Orders seems to designate C-1 and C-2, so based on the map with the C points designated the aiming point must be close to the Orne at those two crossings. The junction you are focusing on might be giving the 323rd too much credit on this mission. They were way off that day (hard to read how many feet from the report, but at least 1,250 -3,500 feet) even tho they got under the clouds to bomb visually. The junction you have ID'd is definitely in the strike area, it just seems like it might be little far from an obviously big road junction.

From what I have gathered, this was the 323rd's first target like this in a fairly large city. (While a marshaling yard is probably in a city center, they are hard to miss. There's only one per city. A road junction in a city had to be a little crazy to find, particularly with flak over the target and after British bombers had bombed Caen earlier in the day through the clouds.) There were significant disconnects between what the ground forces thought were adequate target identifications and what the bombers needed.

The account of "Tex" is also perplexing. It would seem to imply a road closer to the mouth of the Orne where the train crosses the river. Or, parallel to the Orne.

Today, I posted a draft war bio on AAMB for my dad. Tomorrow I have federal tax obligations to focus on. Give me a few days to get that out of the way so I can concentrate exclusively on the aiming point, which is what it will take on my end. You guys are much more skilled at this than me.

Jan

 

Hi, Pat,

I was slightly thrown off by the French accounts, which place the 323rd in the St. Julian Quarter on the other side of the Orne. I don't think that's entirely correct. The square cometary off Rue de Falaise is a good landmark.

Everything seems to point to C-1 and C-2 bridges/junctions at bridges as their primary target. Here's why.

Take a look at CP Still 278. The CP star is right over a major road junction south of C-1 and C-2. It's near the Cemetary.

The next stll after that appears to be the first strikes; those might or might not be Lt. Col. Barker's flight of four in a Box I, Flight 1. (WT-B was in deputy flight lead right behind Barker in WT-O. The camera was to their right in Lt. Anderson's A/C. ) I don't think they are BI, F1.

9th AF reports:

BI,F1 Poor. Center of impact 1,200 feet N of the desired MPI. Fair concentration. Bombs hit among houses on road "T".

(I believe they hit just N of C-1. Or C-2 between the two just on the other side of the Orne. Residences are probably on the side opposite the huge industrial rail yard.)

Box I, Flight2, Gross. Center of impact hitting 1 mile SE of the MPI. Loose concentration. Bombs of A/C 1 and 4 scored direct hits on target C-3, a bridge . At the time time the bombs struck there appears to be a German Av on the bridge.

(This 1 mile SE area appears to be the area near the square Cemetary and Rue de Falaise. it appears to be about 1 mile S of the Orne.)

Box I, Flight 3, Fair results, hitting a point 600 feet N of the MPI. Fair concentration of bombs hit in streets and houses.

(Again, this might be in the just across it the river on the side opposite the MY.)

Box II had a rougher ride, with Box I appearing to have caught the Germans off-guard.

BII, F1 self-reported Fair result, which would be about 500 feet off the target.

BII,F2 Gross results. Center of impact 10,000 feet SE of presided MPI. Bombs hit on a major highway heading N out of town. I believe that is an area of faulty target recognition because the bobardier reported fair results with bombs hitting 150 feet from the AP.

(This would probably be well S of the Orne near Rue de Falaise.

BII,f3 DNB

Box III,F1 DNB

BOX III, F2 Gross. Center of impact 2,000 feet N of desired MPI. Loose concentration. Bombs hit on a grandstand of football field, on streets and houses, and on what appears to be a warehouse or garage. Two German AV are parked long side of the bridge.

(Today, there is a stadium just NW of C-1 across the Orne. This would spear to be the St. Julien neighborhood or quarter referenced by the Frebch resistance. It is well N of the Ornenear Rue de Falaise.)

This mission was a mess. They ran into a lot of flak near Mezidon loosing Maj. Stach and crew. Then lots of flak over the target. This is the first low level mission anyone had flown since the terrible losses a year earlier in Holland. They all thought they weren't coming back. So, they were rattled. Then, trying to find the target had to be difficult with aircraft taking violent evasive action. No doubt they did everything they could to help the ground forces. It was just a bust.

Let me know what you think. I could be way off course .

-Jan

 

Hi, Pat,

Studying your excellent period map, Rue de Arquette and Rue de Jacob and one othe road all converge just South of the Orne at what I will term "Choke Point C-1". It looks like the target for Box I of the 323rd. The results show BI,F1 overshooting it by about 0.20 miles to the North. That puts their strikes just across the river to the Right of the Hippodrome among streets and houses. Not sure which street was "T".

It seems that the major intersection that you highlighted above was MISTAKEN by some Flight Lead Bombardiers to be their primary target. It does look like a major junction. So, you are likely correct in identifying it as their objective.

The bridge that is labelled C-2 has several streets converging just South of it and the Orne. I will term this as "Choke Point C-2." It looks like Box II was assigned this RJ. (Recall that "Tex" recounted following straight down some rail tracks. I believe Rue de Garre would lead to C-2. This looks like it was a major cross-town highway leading North out of town.)

As you uncovered, , Maj. Stach and crew were shot down over Mezidon. It looks like BIII,F2 tried to follow Box I. There is a football stadium about 2 miles NW of "Choke Point C-1".

From the 323rd results, it appears that the B-26 BG that had the C-3 bridge may have done the most damage to the St. Jilien Quarter. At least half of the 323rd's bombs hit 1-2 miles South of the targets, which is South of the Orne. St. Julien is North of the Orne. The other half hit about 0.20 miles from the Orne and the rest seem to have hit near the soccer field. St. Julien is more in line with the Rue de Garre than Rue de Falaise.

Ignoring everything but the known C1-3 bridges, looking at your old map, we know from Moench that the objective was to keep the 12th SS Panzer from moving up from Le Mans to the Canadian and British positions near Caen. If one wanted to jam up rush hour traffic, "Choke Points C-1 and C-2" would do the trick. They are right next to the river crossing, making them ideal points of obstruction.

I have not previously seen a 323rd mission on which there appears to have been so much confusion in recognizing the target. One flight dropped 2 miles South of the correct target and another about 1.80 mikes North of it.

If they weren't completely disrupted by a heavy barrage of flak or fighters, B-26 bombardiers could consistently nail narrow highway and railroad bridges. B-26 crews were known for their accuracy. How could things have gone so wrong at Caen?

Three factors may have been at the root cause-

1 Poor communication with the bomber crews about the location of the target. Caen is a confusion of streets and roads. B-26 targets up to this had been coastal secret weapons sites, war-related factories, airdromes, marshaling yards, bridges and coastal batteries. Ground forces were not experienced in working with bomber groups and vice versa. Bombing as a major war strategy found its advent in WWII. It was new, which is easy to forget.

2 Flak and losing the Box III lead well before the bomb run.

3 The crews were ordered to go in at any altitude necessary to bomb visually. That meant as low as 1,500 feet. In July 1943, the 322 BG lost every single B-26 and crew member over Holland bombing at low altitude on two different missions. You can see it in the faces and postures in the briefing room photograph.

My dad once said, "War is chaos."

Will be interested in your thoughts after you've had a chance to factor in the report on the bombing results.

Best regards,

Jan