Case #1 - Who Strafed Rommel's Car?

Thanks John. There are several reasons why I am trying to work out who sat where. I think there are several accounts and it would be helpful in accurately determining who actually spotted the aircraft and which direction they had come from.

Hello Allan. Yes I can see exactly what you mean regarding Clostermann but on some issues he is arguably combining some accurate information with additional embellishments to make the story more interesting or to conform with his version of a particular event. The references to particular types of ammunition obviously fall into that category. Disseminating fact from fiction might well be impossible today but I think we should try anyway.

I came across a reference to Dietrich's Command Car having been the subject of a previous aerial attack (which he obviously mentioned to Rommel). I would imagine that the photo of the written off Horch earlier in the thread was Dietrich's rather than Rommel's. I think it would make more sense for him to be looking at his own car rather than making the journey to see Rommel's).

I think the question of the escort is quite intriguing . As you say Allan, you would have thought the C in C would have one especially having regard to resistance activity. However, I suppose it is conceivable that as I mentioned previously he might have thought that more than a Command Car with an escort would register as a particularly attractive target to overflying Allied fighters. So far as I can see the only person to mention any form of escort was Clostermann . However the MP motor cyclist outrider he mentions was allegedly killed in the attack and that does in fact, assist with the 602 kill theory so it could be spurious. If there were outriders I would have expected there to have been at least two and if there was an armed escort perhaps another Horch with half a dozen soldiers. However, as I say nobody seems to have commented on an escort one way or another other than Clostermann or Heins whom I consider an unreliable witness. If anybody has noticed any other references or has any more thoughts on the subject perhaps they can put them forward.

Regards

Ian

 

Hello Ian, two things. The car in the magazine article clearly is Dietrich's car. The article say so and also note the SS license plate and what would be the symbol of the I.SS-Pz.K. on the fender. Also, the car was no write off. The fire was extinguished and it continued on its way.

As for the lack of escort for Rommel: how much armed resistance was there really in this area?
There was a massive presence of German troops, the roads were being controlled by allied fighters, so what would be the right way to deploy the resistance movement in that area?

The circumstances in other areas in France were obviously different, but I know of very few direct attacks by the resistance on road targets in Normandy.
If your main threat is coming from the skies, you better not look too important.

Niels

 

Hi Niels

My apologies. In actual fact the photo I noticed was on another site which was also discussing the attack on Rommel so I am attaching a copy so you can see which one I was talking about.

Yes 'don't look important' is a good point and I'm sure they were more worried about aerial attacks but having your C in C travelling with just a driver and three staff members in such a dangerous area could perhaps be considered a little rash I suppose. I guess somebody could have thought about resistance fighters. Perhaps more about the possibility rather than the actuality. And of course we had already taken a pop at him in North Africa plus maybe somebody should have been thinking about the possibility of an SOE inspired attack like the one that took out Heydrich.

Regards

Ian[attachment=181]

 

No apologies needed Ian, going through a few dozen posts makes it easy to miss the link to the article I was referring too: https://www.flickr.com/photos/mlq/9033989524/in/photostream/
As you can see the same photo is included in it.

Apparently someone decided not to let the facts get in the way of a juicy interpretation. It's one of the reasons I do take the time to post corrections. The more people are well informed, the quicker these errors stop being repeated.

 

Hi Niels

Thanks very much. I only saw the smaller version and the damage looked much worse than it does in a close up. The photo I saw was on its own but obviously extracted from that article.
Regards

Ian

 

One of the things I would like to get clear in my mind is the important question of Allied and German time in July 1944.
Earlier in this thread Sean states:

‘As this is mentioned by Mr Fox, it might be a good idea to establish what was or wasn't the case.

He is/was partly correct, in that the Germans were using single (sometimes referred to as "simple") daylight saving time, whilst the Allies were using what is usually reffered to as "double British summer time".

So, double British summer time is two hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). Central European time is one hour ahead of GMT and what you might call the "base" on which the Germans (and most of Europe) ran their clocks. Central European summer time (ie single daylight time, the time referred to by Fox as that used by the Germans) was an hour ahead of that.

Therefore, the time used by the Germans was two hours ahead of GMT, whilst the time used by the Allies was..... two hours ahead of GMT.

As an example of a source for the above, Hubert Meyer's divisional history of the 12.SS has this information on p.21 of the English language version published by JJ Fedorowicz, and the same information in French in the Heimdal edition on page 113’

However I also came across an analysis of the Rommel incident by the archivist of the Tangmere Military Aviation Museum -Reginald Byron – who had this to say on the subject:

‘One very important thing to keep in mind is the time difference, since the timings of the squadrons’ sweeps in relation to the reported time of the attack on Rommel’s car are going to be a crucial matter that we shall have to sort out. Nowadays, we are used to the idea that Western European time is an hour later than British time. But, in July 1944, it was the other way round and this has caused a good deal of confusion over the years in discussions about the Rommel incident.
British Double Summer Time (GMT+2) was the official time used by the Allies during Operation Overlord and the notation used in the squadron ORBs that summer, whether the squadrons were operating from British or French airfields. Summer Time was not used in Axis-occupied Europe, so the clocks remained at GMT+1, making Allied military time an hour later by the clock in France, Germany, and elsewhere on the Continent. This is where it becomes important to appreciate that the local reports of the attack on Rommel’s car were quoted in local time, GMT+1, not Allied military time (GMT+2). Remember that the critical time frame is between 16.00 and 18.30 GMT+1 or, adding an hour, between 17.00 and 19.30 Allied military time.’

The only other reference I could find, (admittedly after a quick internet search) on the subject was the following Wikipedia entry:

In the summer of 1940, the German military authorities switched the occupied northern part of Metropolitan France to GMT+2 (German summer time), while the non-occupied southern part of Metropolitan France remained at GMT+1 (French summer time). The Vichy authorities kept GMT+1 (French summer time) during the winter of 1940–1941 and adopted GMT+2 (double summer time, which was the same as German summer time) in May 1941 in order to unify the railway timetables between occupied and non-occupied Metropolitan France. In 1942, 1943, and 1944 the whole of Metropolitan France thus used GMT+2 during the summer, and GMT+1 during the winter.
At the Liberation of France in the summer of 1944, Metropolitan France kept GMT+2 as it was the time then used by the Allies (British Double Summer Time). In the winter of 1944–1945, Metropolitan France switched to GMT+1, same as in the United Kingdom, and switched again to GMT+2 in April 1945 like its British ally. In September 1945, Metropolitan France returned to GMT+1 (pre-war summer time), which the British had already done in July 1945. Metropolitan France was officially scheduled to return to GMT+0 on November 18, 1945 (the British returned to GMT+0 in on October 7, 1945), but the French government canceled the decision on November 5, 1945,[1] and GMT+1 has since then remained the official time of Metropolitan France.

I would just like to be absolutely sure on this before starting to revisit the various official reports so all help on clarifying the situation would be most appreciated.

Regards

Ian

 

Hello Ian

What source does Reginald Byron give for this assertion?
As far as I'm aware, the only cases I know of in France were some folks who stuck to GMT+1 just to be awkward, so to speak.
Commendable as this is, it has no bearing on what the military of either side were using or referring to.

Until I see a reliable source indicating otherwise, I'm happy to believe that, in this case, Hubert Meyer knew what he was talking about.

Cheers,

Sean

 

Hi Sean

Well that's a fair point so I have just written to Reginald Byron asking for his source. I will post his reply as soon as I have it.

Regards

Ian

 

I have just made nominated a few points on the attached map which I was using to look at some ‘As The Crow Flies’ distances.

On the left hand side is St.Pierre-sur-Drives which was Dietrich’s Headquarters. I shall give some more details shortly but I did think it was interesting that the distance from there to Livarot was 8 miles.

Livarot to Vimoutiers is 6 miles. Livarot to Argentan is 20 miles and Livarot to Flers is 37 miles. Livarot to Caen is 27 miles (not marked) All these distances are ATCF. I mention the last three locations because they were places where there is recorded 602 activity on the 17th.

I am hoping that my next comments will generate some discussion. They relate to Rommel’s travel arrangements on the 17th.

That day Rommel undertook a journey to the front , which at that time ran in a rough line from the Orne estuary -Colombes – Caen (south bank) – Hill 112 – Caumont – St. Lo – Lessay. After a six hour journey Rommel had his first discussion at the command post of the 277th Infantry Division which had become detached in the 1st SS Panzer Corp’s sector. From there he travelled to the 276th Infantry Division who were in the 47th Panzer Corp’s sector. Both divisions had been attacked on the previous day but both had held. Rommel then moved on to the command posts of the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Corps where he had discussions with both commanding officers -Bittrich and Sepp Dietrich.

At about 1600 hours Rommel began the return journey from Dietrich’s Command Post. There had been an Allied breakthrough on another part of the battlefield and he was anxious to get to the Army Group’s Command Post as quickly as possible. Allied air activity had increased considerably since noon. More and more burning vehicles were to be seen. They were blocking the roads and in places it was necessary for Rommel to take evasive action by turning onto side roads in order to avoid enemy fire.

At about 1800 hours Rommel arrived in the region of Livarot where shot up vehicles were piling up. The Germans believed that Allied air activity was intensifying in the area so the car turned off before Livarot onto a concealed side road so that it could rejoin the main road 4 kilometres before Vimoutiers.

Some of this has obviously appeared before but not all of it as far as I am aware.

Any comments?

Regards

Ian
[hr]
Sorry I've lost the map. I 'll have to resurrect it a little later on. However if there is anyone on the forum with some mapping experience I wonder if it would be possible to draw up a map with those locations and incorporate the places he had visited earlier in the day?

Thanks

Ian

 

Hello Ian

Sorry this is a bit late, hope it helps:

This article on "Timing differences UK and Germany during 1940-1945" was published in Bulletin Air War 1939-1945 (Dutch Studygroup Air War WW2) Nr. 99 pages 26/27 as "Time calculation 1940-1945" by the late Rob de Bruin, Great Bookham, England, member of the Studygroep, translated by Mr Jaap Woortman, also a member of the same Studygroup.
Mr Woortman checked two sources: first his own Whitaker Almanac and he also contacted the Royal Observatory at Greenwich. The situation is as follows:
1) Since 1916 Great Britain (from now on called England) has summertime. In winter they have GMT and in summer GMT+1.
2) Middle European Time (MET), that was the time in the Netherlands during the German occupation; it was equal to GMT+1 and during the summer MET is equal to GMT+2.
3) The English introduced on February 25th, 1940, their summertime GMT+1. In the Netherlands we had Dutch time. This means that from February 25th, 1940, it was 40 minutes later in England than in Holland. From May 16th, 1940, the Germans introduced MET and the Dutch were one hour ahead of the English.
4) In England it was summertime during the war from February 25th, 1940, till October 7th, 1945.
5) To get more daylight it went over to Double British Summertime (DBST). This was during:
a - 1941 - May 4th till August 10th;
b - 1942 - April 5th till August 9th;
c - 1943 - April 4th till August 15th;
d - 1944 - April 2nd till September 17th, and
e - 1945 - April 2nd till July 15th.
6) During these periods the time in England was GMT+2 and that's the same as MET (Summertime).
7) To make things more clear some examples:
Date - Time in Holland/Germany - Time in England:
30-05-1940 - 12.28 - 11.28;
22-06-1941 - 06.05 - 06.05;
03-11-1942 - 14.18 - 14.18;
01-04-1943 - 23.25 - 22.25;
01-05-1943 - 20.08 - 20.08;
06-06-1944 - 05.30 - 05.30,
05-05-1945 - 08.00 - 09.00.

8) The change of time was done in the early Sunday morning hours at 2.00 o'clock.
9) Here follows a list of dates when the German time was equal to British time:
a - 1941 - May 4th till August 10th;
b - 1942 - April 5th till August 9th and November 2nd till December 31th;
c - January 1th till March 29th and April 4th till August 15th and October 4th till December 31th;
d - 1944 - January 1th till April 2nd and April 4th till September 17th and October 2nd till December 31th,
e - 1945 – January 1st till April 2nd.

A month after the strafing of Rommel the British 11th Armoured Division (Taurus Pursuant) travelled through Flers, and the divisions only war memorial is just to the north of the town, a few weeks after that the ground echelon of 125 Wing also travelled that way, following the same route around the bottom of the Falaise pocket battlefield on their way to crossing the Seine at Vernon, and I followed this same route last July.

From the 1970 edition of 2TAF, by Christopher Shores - the updated editions are not quite so conclusive!

But it was to 125 Wing that the honours for the day went. Twelve Spitfires of 602 Squadron were on an armed reconnaissance when, near Flers, the commanding officer's section carried out a bounce on six Bf109’s, Le Roux attacking one which crashed before he could open fire. He then strafed a staff car and a motorcyclist; on this mission Flt/Lt Manson was shot down by flak. It was later learnt that the car attacked by Le Roux was carrying the German commander on the Western Front, the famous Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, who suffered a fractured skull as a result, and had to be replaced.
Later in the day six aircraft took off, meeting twenty-five to thirty Bf109’s and Fw 190’s, claiming five destroyed and one damaged for one Spitfire damaged; Capt. T. Johnsen, D.F.C., claimed two Bf109's and Fg/Off M. D. Morgan one, Flt/Lt T. A. Burke and Fg/Off B. J. Oliver each claiming one Fw190. At 2230 hours six more took off and these engaged Bf109’s, Sqn/Ldr Le Roux shooting one down into the sea. He then saw more enemy fighters and damaged one.

Note " and a motorcyclist"

regards

Allan

 

Well that seems pretty conclusive Allan I must say. On that basis it appears to eliminate Le Roux and his section having been responsible, at least from the generally accepted 1540 -1650 mission. Would anybody care to comment on that?

No volunteers for a map at the moment? (See my previous post)

 

No time to help with the map, but some information you might find relevant for it:
The question why Rommel had a meeting in St. Pierre sur Dives is still open. The HQ of the I. SS-Pz.K. was at Urville, not at St. Pierre sur Dives. [This is based on Original German maps]

 

Hello Ian

We have to be in agreement to German as well as Allied timings for the attack - have you also taken a look at the 602 ORB (both Forms 540 and 541) in the Green Room archive?

The original 1970 version of 2TAF was compiled from records available at the time. The later (2005) and much expanded in to 4 volumes is much more comprehensive. 2nd Tactical Air Force Volume 2 Breakout to Bodenplatte July 1944 to January 1945, by Christopher Shores & Chris Thomas, dedicates a whole page to "Who got Rommel?" and also mentions the Typhoons of 193 Squadron, the piece ends with "There is some disparity between accounts, however, as Lang gives the time of the attack as around 1800 whereas 602's ORB records the sorties as taking place between 1540 and 1645. In addition to the Flers and Falaise locations already mentioned, the ORB also records attacks made at Argentan and south-east of Argentan during the same sortie. Falaise and Argentan are the locations nearest (approximately 17 miles) to the site of the attack. Flers is even further away to the west. Allowing for the vagaries of combat and memory, it could have been 602 Squadron that took Rommel out of the battle, but, on today's available evidence the 'proof' hardly seems conclusive."

In the diarised text for 17 July 1944 it states "Again it was 602 Squadron which was first to become involved with opposing aircraft when 12 of its Spitfires were led on an armed Reconnaissance by Sqn Ldr Le Roux during the afternoon. Near Flers six Bf 109s appeared and Le Roux at once got on the tail of one, which crashed before he could even open fire. he then shot up a staff car and a motorcyclist, and claimed damage to a further Bf 109. It later transpired that the car he attacked was probably that carrying Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, who suffered a fractured skull as a result, and had to be replaced (see Who Got Rommell, page 222). During this particular operation Flt Lt D A W Manson's Spitfire was hit by flak, and he crash-landed south-east of Alencon, but was killed."

Sadly, like so many others, Johannes Jacobus "Chris" Le Roux, who had had a very long war, having been a Fairey Battle pilot in the A.A.S.F. in France and was wounded in May 1940, after recovery he became an instructor for a while, but then in February 1941 he was posted to 91 (fighter) Squadron.

He was then sent to North Africa joining 111 Squadron, which he later commanded. Commanding 602 in Normandy was his third tour, and he was lost when his Spitfire failed to arrive in the UK after leaving B.19 Lingèvres (near to Tilly-sur-Seulles) on 29 August in bad weather.

I visited the site of the former B.19 Lingèvres in July, and, naturally, after all this time it is back to a cornfield, but it was probably exactly as it was when the RAF Airfield Construction unit turned up to create the ALG, which came in to operation in mid-August.

Most probably a few burned out Sherman's were still there from the battles for the area, being from the 4/7th Royal Dragoon Guards, and a commemorative plaque is near the site commemorating the action, and their losses.

Although nothing to do with 125 Wing, 602 or 193 Squadrons or indeed Rommel I feel that this needs a greater airing, especially as we are a Normandy battlefield research forum:

On the 14th June A Squadron were supporting the 9th Durham Light Infantry in the attack on Lingevres on the left flank, and B Squadron were supporting the 6th Durham Light Infantry on the right flank. The casualties remembered on the plaque are all members of 4th Troop B Squadron 4/7th Royal Dragoon Guards who experienced the colossal loss of life in that one action. By the end of the day B Squadron only had one tank left.

The fate of B Squadron is overshadowed by the success of A Squadron during the attack and the exploits of Sergeant Harris who’s tank knocked out 5 Panther tanks.

From Wikipedia about the Sherman Firefly - A similar example occurred on 14 June, during Operation Perch. Sgt. Harris of the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards, along with three standard Shermans, set up defensive positions along with the infantry after successfully driving out the Germans in the village of Lingèvres, near Tilly-sur-Seulles. Looking through his binoculars, Sgt. Harris spotted two Panthers advancing from the east. He opened fire at a range of 800 metres (870 yd), knocking out the lead Panther with his first shot, and the second Panther with his second. Relocating to a new position on the other side of the town, he spotted another three Panthers approaching from the west. From his well-concealed flanking position, he and his gunner, Trooper Mackillop, eliminated all three with just three rounds. Harris and his gunner had knocked out five Panthers with as many rounds, demonstrating the potency of the Firefly, especially when firing from a defensive position on advancing enemy tanks

regards

Allan

 

Thanks for that Neils.

That was a bit sloppy of me. I knew that Rommel's return journey had commenced from Dietrich's Command Post. I wasn't sure of the location so I picked the place mentioned in the After The Battle article which , I believe, had been attributed to Lang. Michael Reynolds in 'Steel Inferno' states, like you, that Dietrich's Command Post was at Urville which I believe is 20 miles as the crow flies to Livarot. Having said that Sainte Pierre sur Dives is 8 miles from Urville and actually on the route to Livarot so it may be that they actually passed through it on the way back.

However Rommel left Dietrich's Command Post at about 1600 and arrived in the region of Livarot at about 1800. At this point they still had to negotiate the concealed road and re-join the main road 4 km before Vimoutiers So there were still some further minutes of travel to go before they arrived there. This would suggest the attack took place well after six which, on the face of it, tends to eliminate Le Roux and his section from having been responsible on the 1540 to 1650 mission since they would have been back on the ground well over an hour previously.

Would anybody like to discuss this?

Regards

Ian

 

Hello Ian,

From a few pages back....

I think it's just that (reference point). Probably...

Likewise, unable to help with the map at the moment, I'm afraid.

Cheers,

Sean

 

Yes I think you are right Sean. Lang may well have used Saint Pierre sur Dives as a point of reference for the After The Battle article.

On the other hand the contemporary German account of the incident (compiled in August 1944) specifically states that Rommel began the return journey from Dietrich’s command post so , on the basis of our previous discussions, I think we can now say definitively that it was Urville that he left from.

I am sure that Lang was instrumental in compiling the report along with Neuhaus. Perhaps Holke also made a contribution. It is possible that Rommel did too but what I am certain of is that Rommel actually agreed with the contents of the report. Whether or not anyone else was involved , Dietrich, for example, I cannot say. In any event I also believe that Lang had a copy of the report which he referred to when he was questioned on the subject after the war.

The report states that Rommel left Dietrich’s Command Post at 1600. I think that would be accurate to within say 15 minutes on either side. As I mentioned previously he arrived in the region of Livarot at 1800. On balance I also believe that to be correct with perhaps the same latitude of 15 minutes on either side. He still had some way to go before the attack took place but, at the moment, I personally believe now that it happened between 1800 and 1830.

Thanks for your info Allan. Yes I have read Volume 2 of the 2nd TAF and noted what they say. Although I have approached this story in what I hope is an objective fashion I think a part of me was hoping that 602 would be ‘in the frame’ so to speak. It was important to double-check any differences between Allied and German time but now that it seems incontrovertible that there was no differential I feel absolutely certain that 602 have to be ruled out entirely and I have read the relevant ORB entries in the Green Room.

So I guess we will have to look elsewhere. If anyone is interested I have some more information which might help us to tie down the place of the attack perhaps more accurately than previously but I believe it might require considerable input and I am conscious that my fellow Forum members lead busy lives (as indeed I do) but if there is enough interest I am happy to participate. It would also include reviewing where the attack came from which, if nothing else, might assist in eliminating more claimants.

Regards

Ian
PS. I didn’t know Le Roux had been a Fairey Battle pilot Allan. Coincidentally two of my children’s great uncle was a Fairey Battle Pilot. He was shot down and was one of the RAFs first POWs in Dulag Luft.

Your reference to Shermans was also interesting as a friend of mine (now deceased) told me how he took on a Panzer in Normandy. His name was John Gorman and he got an immediate MC for it I think. The casual way he explained it made me laugh!

 

hello Ian

The information on JJ "Chris" Le Roux is taken from the piece on him in "Aces High" Volume 1 by Christopher Shores & Clive Williams (published by Grub Street in 1994, updated from the 1966 original), naming all known British and Commonwealth (also includes Czech, French, Belgian, Polish etc., but not U.S.) pilots securing 5 victories or more.

Because of my personal interest in 125 Airfield/Wing, and its constituent squadrons throughout its service between June 1943 - July 1945, I still hope it comes out in favour of 602, so anything you can add would be of interest - work commitments permitting, naturally - and hope that your information puts this matter finally to rest, regardless of who was the victor.

Although of course, with Rommel removed from the battlefield at a vital stage, we all gained - regardless of the pilot/squadron involved.

regards

Allan

 

Hi Allan

Thanks for your comments. I too was rather hoping that 602 would 'win the day' but after reviewing the situation I cannot really understand how they got into the frame in the first place in view of the time disparity. Perhaps the attributions were made without an accurate understanding of the difference in Allied and German timings. Bearing in mind our previous discussions I suppose this is a possibility.

Something that ought to be sorted out once and for all is just where the attack came from. With that in mind I have drawn up the attached sketch to demonstrate where each occupant of the car was sitting at the time of the attack.

Would anybody like to comment on this?

Regards

Ian

 

Pat, don't have the locations of the command posts of the two divisions, but I'll send you a German map of 17 July 2944.