To continue... As of 0100 hours on 8th August, all the original objectives had been reached: Bellefontaine and Saint Barthelemy in the north Bion and Saint Jean du Corail in the south Mortain (almost completely) in the centre It was this last central objective at Mortain which was literally 'so near and yet so far'. The Mortain sector was held by the newly arrived U.S. 30th 'Old Hickory' Infantry Division and despite yielding ground in some areas of the sector, having only just relieved the 1st Infantry Division, critical hill top positions around the town were held against the German onslaught. The German attack came over ideal ground as Eddy Florentin describes: The author goes on to describe the 2nd Panzer Division cutting the main Sourdeval - Mortain road at La Tournerie... The panzers, hinged on two infantry divisions of VII Korps, then raced on and overran an anti-tank company which held the village of Mesnil Tove, just 25 Kilometers from Avranches. Progressing still further west, they then took the adjoining village of Mesnil Adelee, four kilometers nearer their goal at 0600 on the 8th August. A reconnaissance patrol was sent forward to a location which is described as... ...which, although I see Brecey and Reffuville on GE, I cannot locate just now! Anyone able to find this location which I deduce is the closest the Germans get to the sea. Avranches is said to be 19 kilometers away at this point. More follows... Regards, Pat
Hello Pat, Would not the junction of the D48 and D79 fit the bill? The former heading down to Refuville, the latter to Brécey. As the crow flies it's pretty much bang on 19km to the centre of Avranches. Cheers, Sean
Sean, BTW, I've been reading the Stackpole books on the 12th SS Panzer Division with a view to opening a new thread on this formation. Therein I found several references to a 'Zug' unit size. What size is this and does it pertain only to armour units? Thanks Sean, Pat
'Zug' is simply the German word for platoon. You might find this one useful. TM 30-506 German Military Dictionary: https://archive.org/download/TM30-506/TM30-506.pdf
Thanks Niels, So it's not specifically a reference to a platoon in an armoured formation? Regards, Pat
To return to Avranches, I've taken te liberty to copy some related entries from various records of XXV.A.K. Hey, I was working on the 77.Inf.Div. any way. ;-) 30 July 20:50 23:45: Call Hptm Gruß – Maj. von Raven 23:50: Maj. Johannes – Maj. von Raven 24:00: Oberst Bacherer – Maj. von Raven 31 July 01:35: XXV.A.K. sent following order to the 77.Inf.Div. At 03:45 XXV.A.K. sent the following order to 'Valentin', CC to 77.I.D. 09:35: Call Oberst Bader – Maj. Seiffert 12:30: Call Oberst Bader – Maj. Johannes 15.15: Call Maj. Seiffert (Ia 77.I.D.) with Ia XXV.A.K. 16:00: Call Maj. Seiffert (Ia 77.I.D.) with Ia XXV.A.K. 19.30: Call Oberst Bacherer - Ia (XXV)
Thanks Niels, It would be very useful if you could keep an eye on the accounts in the book and let us know if they are corroborated in the German records whenever available. To continue from p. 62... The fog lifted from Mortain Hill around noon on the 8th August with disastrous consequences for General Hausser. This was to be the last offensive of his career but as he left his command post in Le Mans for the last time, the August sun was slowly revealing the locations of the German positions around Mortain and the fighter-bombers of 2nd TAF were waiting to pounce. The German ground commanders reported the stalled offensive: Generalleutnant Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz (Commander, 2nd Panzer Division) - "We can do nothing against the fighter-bombers. They descend in their hundreds firing their rockets on concentrations of tanks and vehicles." General (Baron) Hans von Funck (Commander, XXXXVII Panzer Korps) - "The activities of the fighter-bombers are almost intolerable." 1st SS Panzer HQ - "The air attacks are of an intensity hitherto unknown. The advance of the 1st SS Panzer has been brought to a halt." The 116th Panzer had not even left its jumping off positions before it too was paralysed by the aerial onslaught. At General 'Pete' Quesada's U.S. Ninth Air Force HQ, the tally was counted: The author goes on to state that a German observer, commenting after the war, stated: Eisenhower also stated: The authors notes however would appear to add caution to the this belief that it was air power alone which halted the Mortain Offensive. In particular the reference to the German post war comment states: Here is an obituary from The Telegraph for Group Captain Charles Green. An interesting Wiki article on General 'Pete' Quesada can be seen here. The colour photo therein answers a query I recently noted regarding the identity of a senior USAAF officer shown having a stand up meal with his staff on A1 ALG. More follows - additional information, corrections and comment welcome in the meantime. Regards, Pat
Those numbers are a typical example of exagerated claims by air crews. When the battlefield was examined only 46 tanks and assault guns were found. Only 9 had been knocked out from the air, 20 were lost to ground weapons and 11 were abandoned or destroyed by their crews. The cause of 6 losses could not be determined. In can't say how complete the examination was, but it is rather obvious the claims were much, much too high. I'm fairly certain these numbers have been discussed in greater detail on AHF though.
Thanks Niels, It must have been difficult to do an accurate count from the air under combat conditions, so perhaps the errors are understandable. Also understandable is the fear felt by German tank crews as they watched the attacking Typhoons approaching. An abandoned tank is just as much a loss as one burning! To continue from p. 63... Von Kluge received the news of the stalled counter offensive at his HQ situated at La Gagnerie in Saint Germain en Laye. The location is described as: Anyone know this location? The Feldmarshall, with the title of 'Oberbefehlshaber West' was now under no illusion. His last chance had vanished under the enemy onslaught, let it be from Typhoons, American artillery or GIs with bazookas. The bad news continued to flow in all afternoon on 8th August, with field commanders requesting permission to withdraw: However, even worse news now reached von Kluge - as the German attack had commenced towards Avranches at midnight, Montgomery had crossed the Orne River with the 43rd British Division below Grimbosq. Hitler then added to the burden of the beleaguered Feldmarshall in ordering the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions be withdrawn from the Potigny-Vire sector and flung into the maelstrom which was the Mortain counter-offensive. This gap in the German lines was quickly exploited by General Dempsey and his 11th British Armoured Division. And still more...to the south, American General Oliver's armour had reached the Sarthe River at Noyen, Fille and Spay. Von Kluge's staff at Saint Germain en Laye, following the communications pouring into the HQ, began to prepare the inevitable withdrawal orders. The task was well underway when they were stopped in their tracks by a short, curt telegram from Rastenburg. It read: At 19:40 hours on the 8th August, von Kluge finally admitted to Eberbach that the attack was failing. At 21:00 the attack most feared by all German generals in Normandy was launched: Operation Totalize had commenced. More follows...comments and corrections welcome as always Regards, Pat
Yes, but only if the crew did not return There are complaints from German officers about inexperienced crews leaving their tanks and seek shelter outside of it, which was actually considered to be more dangerous. It shouldn't be forgotten either that there are numerous reasons to abandon a vehicle: breakdowns, lack of fuel or ammunition, lack of (infantry) support, direct enemy pressure, etc., etc. Statements from German officers are often used to support allied air force claims regarding their success. This may sound like a solid approach, but it overlooks the fact both sides benefited from such claims. For German ground forces (incl. high ranking officers) the allied air force (and thus failure of the Luftwaffe) was a rather common excuse, and it certainly was not always justified. They tried to shift responsibility to others. In fact many of these officers have been criticized themselves, for their own decisions or on how they exaggerated the effects of the allied air force. The same 'almighty air force' excuse was also embraced by certain German groups after the war: we only lost because it wasn't a fair fight because the allies had more planes, tanks, etc. than poor Germany. Overestimating the effects of the allied air force thus has some rather nasty side-effects. Any way, my point is this: The effectiveness of the allied air force as a tactical force is very hard to determine. It is often overrated by the air forces themselves and also by many German claims. Allied and German claims regarding the effects cannot be taken at face value, but require a close examination. Kill claims are especially vulnerable for inflation and there are numerous examples of claims exceeding the actual number of tanks used in an operation.
Hi Niels, Good points indeed. Whatever the actual German loss numbers attributable to either air or ground action, the nett effect was that Operation 'Lüttich' ground to a halt. Most observers agree that this was the beginning of the end for the German forces in Normandy, with no further major offensive action being possible with the depleted forces afterwards available. Over the following two weeks of August, the Battle of the Falaise Gap would see levels of carnage heretofore un-imagined in the West. I've been digging to see if the location of Field Marshall von Kluge's HQ at Saint Germain en Laye is known and not for the first time I have found that the answer appears in Jean Paul Pallud's excellent book 'Ruckmarsch!' (p.47). The author tracked down several ground photos to what is now known as College Marcel Roby at 31, Rue Alexandre-Dumas. The school is named after a mathematics teacher from the school who was a Resistance fighter arrested by the Germans in 1942 (some sources say 1943) and died in Buchenwaild in March 1944. Below is one of Jean Pauls finds from the German Bundesarchiv, showing von Kluge with his staff at his villa in the school grounds. The date is 11th August 1944 and it must be one of the last photos taken of the beleaguered Field Marshall before he committed suicide on the 19th August: I cannot be sure, but I think the villa marked below within the triangular school grounds (1-3) was the Field Marshall's HQ: Anyone able to confirm or correct? Thanks, Pat
Hello Pat I realise you are quoting but this piece is inaccurate "Ten squadrons of R.A.F. Typhoons and Thunderbolts of the 2nd Tactical Air Force were alerted by radio. And now they were speeding in to the kill in close formation, supported by excellent ground to air liaison." - the RAF were not operating Thunderbolts in Western Europe, these belonged to their US brothers-in-arms. regards Allan
Hi Allan, Yes, I spotted that and am pretty sure its just a translation glitch. The book was first published in French in 1964. The edition I am working from is the first English version published a year later by Elek Books in London. Just to clarify for other readers, 2nd TAF was a RAF only force with no American involvement. Regards, Pat
Hello Pat Yes, I agree, probably lost in translation - however, although mainly RAF, 2nd TAF was truly an international command, comprised of Australian, Belgian, British, Canadian, Czech, Dutch, French, New Zealand, Norwegian and Polish squadrons (no Danish squadrons existed, but Danes served on British and Norwegian squadrons). See http://www3.sympatico.ca/angels_eight/2tac.html To go with its international credentials, 2nd TAF was commanded by a man considered a New Zealander, but who was actually born in Australia, Air Marshal Sir Arthur "Mary" Coningham KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, DFC, AFC., who had served in the New Zealand Expeditionary Force from August 1914, and when invalided out due to illness came over to the UK and enlisted in the RFC in April 1916, and remained with the RFC as it evolved in to the RAF, staying in the service post-war. The Thunderbolts were probably from IX Fighter Command, part of the US Ninth Tactical Air Force. See http://www3.sympatico.ca/angels_eight/9tac.html More please from The Battle of the Falaise Gap. regards Allan
Hi Allan, Be it from the original French or via the English translation, the prose used in the book has a unique ability to impart an impressive insight into the story of the Falaise Gap - I particularly like the way small details pertaining to individuals are interwoven with the canvas of the Battle for Normandy. The approach adds real drama to what could have been just a collection of dates and numbers. Below is a case in point which I will not touch with my keyboard for fear of ruining the brilliant storyline. Its just a short paragraph from the German side before we meet the Canadians and Poles in 'Totalize'. P.65 refers: There is very little information available on this German division on the web. Does anyone know where we might learn more? Thanks, Pat
What sort of information are you looking for? The division was part of the 25.Welle, which means it is (sort of) a sister unit to the 77., 94. and 95.Inf.Div. and the 91.LL.Div. Like the other divisions, it was built from a reinforced infantry regiment: Gren.Rgt.1023 in January 1944. The division had two infantry regiments (1055 and 1056), an artillery regiment with two light and one medium battalions, a Pz.Jg.Kp. and a Füs-Btl. with four companies. The Pi.Btl. may have had two companies but I'll have to check to be sure. I have no detailed information on the equipment of the artillery regiment. Most likely the first two battalions had both two batteries with four 10,5-cm howitzers each. Third battalion probably had a similar organization but with either 8,8-cm Flak or Pak or possibly the prefered 15-cm s.FH.18.
Thanks Niels, Do you have anything on their short time in Normandy? I presume their arrival from Norway sometime during the first week of August was their first tour in that part of France? I note their location NW of Potigny on the 11th August on the map below from page 70 of the book: Any information from war diaries or other sources would be welcome. Regards, Pat
Hello Pat I quite agree with your comment "the prose used in the book has a unique ability to impart an impressive insight into the story of the Falaise Gap", and on that basis I can forgive him for the small error of attributing the Thunderbolt to the 2nd Tactical Air Force! More please !! Whilst on here can I take the opportunity to advise of the results of a shopping trip to W H Smith (a newsagent to our US members and guests) where I purchased an "Osprey Publishing RBA Special Offer - 2 books only £4.99" - they are two hardback books in the "Osprey's Battles of World War II" series - "D-Day 1944 (3) Sword Beach & the British Airborne landings" and "D-Day 1944 (4) Gold & Juno Beaches" - I presume that (1) and (2) refer to the US landings on Utah Beach and Omaha Beach, and associated airborne landings, but I have not, at present, found out as to whether they have been re-published as well. I also had delivered, by "The Book People" today "The Times D-Day - The story of D-Day through maps" for £6.25 instead of the RRP of £25.00 - more great reading for a fraction of the original prices. Regards Allan